

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION **CONFIDENTIAL**

Deputy Director, Administration

23 November 1951

Assistant Director, Research and Reports

Classification of ORR Organization Chart

25X1A

1. Under [REDACTED] as at present enforced, no details of any part of CIA's organizational structure may be transmitted to anyone outside CIA without the specific approval of the DCI. I am fully aware of the importance of this Regulation as it applies to organizational details of the more sensitive operating parts of the Agency.

2. I wonder, however, if the Regulation is not unnecessarily strict in its application to the organization chart of ORR. I should like to have some consideration given to whether the AD/RR might not be given authority at his discretion to reveal organizational arrangements within ORR, excluding D/2 (the Strategic Division), to persons or organizations authorized to receive CIA material classified SECRET or higher. Considerations supporting this request are as follows:

a. There appears to me to be nothing about the details of the organization of ORR, excluding D/2, which is in any way more sensitive than is implied by an ordinary SECRET classification. Indeed, the broad outlines of our organizational arrangements might, it seems to me, well be classified still lower.

b. We are in receipt of detailed organization charts from the other U.S. intelligence agencies and [REDACTED] giving not only the organizational structure but the names of all the key officials of these other organizations dealing in any way with economic matters. They have requested reciprocal service, and there seems to be no good reason why we should not supply it.

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c. In the discharge of our coordinating responsibilities as laid upon us by NSCID 15 each of our commodity, industry, service and analysis branches is under instructions to keep in touch with all knowledgeable persons in their respective fields having appropriate security classifications. In dealing with other agencies it is highly desirable to be able to give them a list of people with whom they should keep in touch in CIA and indicate their functional areas of responsibility. In particular, we are trying to encourage a full exchange of information and ideas within the limits of existing security regulations between specialists in [REDACTED] and special-ists in ORR. It is necessary in order to make this exchange most fruitful for us to advise [REDACTED] who our specialists are and what their organizational positions are.

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NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐  
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4. It is my understanding that this request is consistent with the recommendations of the Dulles report, which, as I understand it, now reflects the policy of the Agency. One of these recommendations was that the overt offices should be better understood by people with appropriate security clearances throughout the Government in order to more effectively draw attention from the more sensitive parts of the Agency. This requires somewhat freer discussion of organizational details of an overt office like OER. It is submitted that these organizational details in no way reveal any information not already much more fully revealed in other classified papers issued by the Agency not subject to the special restriction above mentioned.

5. I would greatly appreciate your expediting this request in any way you find possible as we are currently embarrassed by being unable to reciprocate a service rendered us by other intelligence agencies with whom we are anxious to remain on good terms.

MAX F. MILLIKAN

AD/RR:MFKillikan:at

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